Development Bank Research Bulletin

The happy variety of Capitalism

The Deutsche Bank Research has just published a report titled “The Happy Variety of Capitalism.” (download PDF file)

Capitalism has many varieties; Even within Europe, the mode of capitalism differs across countries.

According to the report, Germany, Spain, France, Belgium and Austria has the less happy variety of capitalism, while Portugal, Italy and Greece, even worse, has the UNHAPPY variety of capitalism (well, Italian may be a little bit loud, but I am sure they are very happy everyday; it is just a different way of having fun)

Some funny facts:

Napping is an activity just a little bit happier than cooking. So when your feel drowsy, do some cooking instead; at least you will have something to eat as a result, and yes, lunch and dinner are happiness-improving activities.

Morning commute makes people very unhappy, even much unhappy than working; and evening commute is just a little bit happier than working.

Australia has the very happy variety of capitalism. Thousands of German still migrate to Australia every year.

Return to Capital is not low in China

There are two famous myths about China.

The first one is that the savings rate is high because ordinary Chinese worry about the lack of safety net. This myth has been busted because evidence has shown that Chinese household savings rate is actually lower than the Indian one. The overall saving rate is high because businesses heavily save their self-generated profit for re-investment. For private business, the reason is the lack of access to other forms of external finance. For state-owned enterprises, managers always prefer re-investing the profits to paying dividends to the government. Therefore, the right solution is: (a) to reform the financial sector and improve the access to finance for private sector businesses; (b) force state-owned enterprises to pay dividends! Building a safety certainly will help, but only at the margin.

The second famous myth is that return to capital is very low in China, and that the current high investment rate is a sign of money being wasted. A NBER working paper "The return to capital in China", written by three prominent Chinese economists, however shows that the return to capital in China has been remained flat at roughly 20% since 1998, which is not low compared to the rest of the world. Olivier Blanchard also provides a nice discussion (PDF file) of of the results.

As a matter of fact, the myth about the high investment rate per se has also been overturned. Goldman Sachs economist Hong Liang show that the investment rate is between 36%-40%, and the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) is about 3.1 in recent years. These are two very reasonable numbers for a rapidly growing economy. In at least the export-oriented sectors in China, improvement in productivity still remains that greatest driver of growth.

I have long been the subscriber of the view that China is still a very poor country; the gap to the productivity frontier is still so wide that the main decision to make is still how much to invest rather than where to invest. Chinese are starting to worry about investment efficiency, but at this moment it is still of second order importance. The nation’s production is still so inefficient that there are numerous easy opportunities waiting for entrepreneurs to capitalize on. In order for this to happen, the government should remove the planning-economy-era regulations that create the inefficiency, and protect the property rights of entrepreneurs. These reforms will create prosperity much more than will any scientific breakthrough.

Newspapers like to repeat the same punch line “the money is wasted in building roads that lead to nowhere” when describing the government investment in infrastructure in China. But people familiar with the geography of China would find it difficult to find any such “roads that lead to nowhere.” Even if an idiot randomly draw a line on the map in the eastern seaboard and build a toll road; in five years the road capacity will be full. That’s exactly why there are so many corruptions in such infrastructure projects: high returns are guaranteed so long as you can get the license to build the toll roads that almost always lead to somewhere. The new Chinese saying: money follows the roads.

The Return to Capital in China (download pdf file)
Chong-En Bai, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Yingyi Qian
NBER Working Paper No. 12755
December 2006
ABSTRACT: China's investment rate is one of the highest in the world, which naturally leads one to suspect that the return to capital in China must be quite low. Using the data from China's national accounts, we estimate the rate of return to capital in China. We find that the aggregate rate of return to capital averaged 25% during 1978-1993, fell during 1993-1998, and has become flat at roughly 20% since 1998. This evidence suggests that the  aggregate return to capital in China does not appear to be significantly lower than the return to capital in the rest of the world. We also find that the standard deviation of the rate of return to capital across Chinese provinces has fallen since 1978.

Inefficient banking sector in China is actually an optimal way of taxation

It is well perceived that China's state-monopoly banking sector (with the help of capital control) is a powerful tool in channelling private sector wealth into loss-making state-owned enterprises and numerous white-elephants public infrastructure projects.

A paper written by several Chinese economists however argues that such a mechanism is actually optimal. The idea is as follows.

In developing countries, it is usually very difficult for the government to collect taxes (everyone hides their income), and official taxation is usually very inefficient (it creates a lot of distortion in the economy and a disproportionate burden on hard-working and smart people). Formal taxation thus becomes very costly and creates a lot of dead-weight costs.

But the government needs money and by whatever means the government will try to extract revenue from the private sector. Conditional on the "grabbing hand" nature of the government, an “implicit taxation” by channeling private sector wealth into low-return public projects, through the monopoly banking sector, becomes an optimal and efficient solution:  it is efficient because (1) the cost of “tax “collection is low (you can avoid it only if you completely go underground) (2) the “taxation” is relatively fair and less distorting (it is proportionate to your existing wealth).

Certainly it is even better if the government does not try to extort the private sector in the first place. But if the government does do it, it is better that it does it through the banking sector. At least you don’t need to pay the robber to rob you, and at least hard-working people don’t have higher chance of being robbed.

When a gun is pointed at you, it makes no sense to fight. Take my money but don't hurt me.

Financial Repression and Optimal Taxation (pdf file)

Chong-en Bai, David D. Li, Yingyi Qian, Yijiang Wang

Financial repression entails an implicit taxation on savings. When effective income-tax rates are very uneven, as common in developing countries, raising some government revenue through mild financial repression can be more efficient than collecting income tax only.

Outsourcing is good for American job growth! Two data-intensive evidence

As more manufacturing and service jobs are outsourced to developing countries, complaints arise domestically that it is responsible for the “jobless growth” in the U.S.

Two research papers recently produced however provide evidence that outsourcing is actually good for American job growth. 

The first study, authored by Mihir Desai, Fritz Foley, and James Hines Jr., investigates migration of manufacturing production to developing countries. They show  that 10% greater foreign capital investment is associated with 2.2% greater domestic investment, and that 10% greater foreign employee compensation is associated with 4.0% greater domestic employee compensation.

You may ask: “but the growth is not proportional – growth in the U.S. is smaller!”.  But this already is a serious blow to those who believe that the impact should have been negative!  Furthermore, 10% growth in compensation for foreign workers is much smaller than 4% growth in compensation for U.S. workers (who’s pay level starts at least 10 times that of their foreign counterparts.

The second study, authored by Mary Amiti and Shang-Jin Wei, looks into service outsourcing, which is feared by white-collar workers.

They show that,  in each of the past 10 years, the value of US insourcing (i.e. the value of business services expoerted by a country like the U.S., e.g., high-priced business consultants and lawyers in richer countries offering their services to the rest of the world) has been greater than that of US outsourcing! This is true even though the US has been running a trade deficit and an overall current account deficit.

Examining 100 sectors of the U.S. economy, they also show that there  is no evidence that the most outsourcing-intensive sectors have had systematically slower (or negative) job growth in the last decade. In fact, the millwork and plywood sector, the metal coating, engraving, and allied services sector, and the insurance industry have had some of the fastest increases in service outsourcing but at the same time also some of the fastest
rates of job creation.

Study 1: Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Economic Activity   (pdf file)
Abstract:   How does rising foreign investment influence domestic economic activity? Firms whose foreign operations grow rapidly exhibit coincident rapid growth of domestic operations, but this pattern alone is inconclusive, as foreign and domestic business activities are jointly determined. This study uses foreign GDP growth rates, interacted with lagged firm-specific geographic distributions of foreign investment, to predict changes in foreign investment by a large panel of American firms. Estimates produced using this instrument for changes in foreign activity indicate that 10% greater foreign capital investment is associated with 2.2% greater domestic investment, and that 10% greater foreign employee compensation is associated with 4.0% greater domestic employee compensation. Changes in foreign and domestic sales, assets, and numbers of employees are likewise positively associated; the evidence also indicates that greater foreign investment is associated with additional domestic exports and R&D spending. The data do not support the popular notion that greater foreign activity crowds out domestic activity by the same firms, instead suggesting the reverse.

Study 2: Fear of Service Outsourcing: Is It Justified?   (pdf file)
Abstract:      The recent media and political attention on service outsourcing from developed to developing countries gives the impression that outsourcing is exploding. As a result, workers in industrial countries are anxious about job losses. This paper aims to establish what are the hypes and what are the facts. The results show that although service outsourcing has been steadily increasing it is still very low, and that in the United States and many other industrial countries "insourcing" is greater than outsourcing. Using the United Kingdom as a case study, we find that job growth at a sectoral level is not negatively related to service outsourcing.
(Also check out Raghuram Rajan and Shang-Jin Wei's op-ed "The non-threat that is outsourcing (pdf file))

What’s so special about China’s exports? They are too sophisticated.

One special characteristic of Chinese exports is that they are too technologically sophisticated for a typical developing country at this stage of development. Certainly it is sometimes foreign parent companies that control the most value-adding stage of the production chain of these products, and Chinese may not contribute that much technologically, there are benefits associated with such an export pattern.

According to new study Harvard professors Ricardo Hausmann, Jason Hwang, and Dani, this export pattern is beneficial to China’s future growth, because knowledge can spillover from these sophisticated productions, while in countries specialize in commodity exporting, they may not have a chance to learn at all.

What You Export Matters (pdf file)
When local cost discovery generates knowledge spillovers, specialization patterns become partly indeterminate and the mix of goods that a country produces may have important implications for economic growth. We demonstrate this proposition formally and adduce some empirical support for it. We construct an index of the "income level of a country's exports," document its properties, and show that it predicts subsequent economic growth.

Also see their case study of China:
What’s so special about China’s exports? (pdf file)

Finance professors rush to China

2006 seems to be a Year of China for economics and finance professors. Although many professors already realized the importance of China very early on, it is in this year that people start to think that the next research frontier has to be China, and you better start working on some China-related topics before others publish them. Professors are no different from multinational corporations that rush to China to seek for profits.

A keystone is that the Financial Intermediation Research Society, a prestigious association of U.S. and European finance professors, headed by Wharton Professor Franklin Allen, decided to host its biennial conference in Shanghai, China.

Here I recommend two papers by Franklin Allen that I think can help you better understand the past, present and future of China’s financial system. They are not very technical papers, so you shouldn’t need any academic background to understand them.

China's Financial System: Past, Present, and Future  (pdf file) (by Franklin Allen, Jun "QJ" Qian, and Meijun Qian)

Abstract:  We examine and compare the role of China's financial system in supporting the growth of firms and the economy with that in other countries, and explore directions of future development. First, we find that the current financial system is dominated by a large but inefficient banking sector, and reducing the amount of non-performing loans among the major banks to normal levels is the most important objective for reforming the financial system in the short run. Second, despite the fast growth of the stock market, its role of resource allocation in the economy has been both limited and ineffective. Further development of China's financial markets is the most important long-term objective. Third, we find that the most successful part of the financial system, in terms of supporting the growth of the overall economy, is a non-standard sector that consists of alternative financing channels, governance mechanisms, coalitions, and institutions. This sector should co-exist with banking and markets in the future in order to continue to support the growth of the Hybrid Sector (non-state, non-listed firms). Finally, in order to sustain stable economic growth, China should aim to prevent and halt damaging financial crises, including a banking sector crisis, a real estate or stock market crash, and a "twin crisis" in the currency market and banking sector.

Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China  (pdf file)

Abstract:      China is an important counterexample to the findings in the law, institutions, finance, and growth literature: neither its legal nor financial system is well developed by existing standards, yet it has one of the fastest growing economies. We examine 3 sectors of the economy: the State Sector (state-owned firms), the Listed Sector (publicly listed firms), and the Private Sector (all other firms with various types of private and local government ownership). The law-finance-growth nexus established by existing literature applies to the State and Listed Sectors: with poor legal protections of minority and outside investors, external markets are weak, and the growth of these firms is slow or negative. However, with arguably poorer applicable legal and financial mechanisms, the Private Sector grows much faster than the State and Listed Sectors, and provides most of the economy’s growth. This suggests that there exist effective alternative financing channels and governance mechanisms, such as those based on reputation and relationships, to support this growth.

India loses one-third of income tax to the U.S., because of brain drains

India has been suffering from loss of talents because of migration of highly-educated people to the U.S.  Several economics professors have put out a hard number to quantify part of the loss.

According to a study done by  Mihir A. Desai, Devesh Kapur and John McHale, the foregone income tax revenues associated with the Indian-born residents of the U.S. comprise one-third of current Indian individual income tax receipts.

This however only counts in  the fiscal cost, which is but a trivial component of the total loss India incurs. Had there engineers stayed in India and had they been able to make the best use out of their talents in India, India would have been a much more innovative and technologicaly-advanced country by now.  Certainly here we have to assume that the institutions and business enviroment in India could allow them to make the best use of their talents, which certainly is a very strong and unrealistic assumption.

The Fiscal Impact of High Skilled Emigration: Flows of Indians to the U.S. (PDF file)
Abstract: Easing immigration restrictions for the highly skilled in developed countries portend a future of increased human capital outflows from developing countries. The myriad consequences of these developments for developing countries include the direct loss of the fiscal contributions of these highly skilled individuals. This paper analyzes the fiscal impact of this loss of talent for a developing country by examining human capital flows from India to the U.S. The escalation of the emigration of highly skilled professionals from India to the U.S is examined by surveying evidence on the changing nature of the Indian-born in the U.S. during the 1990s. The loss of talent to India during the 1990s was dramatic and highly concentrated amongst the prime-age work force, the highly educated and high earners. In order to estimate the fiscal losses associated with these emigrants, this paper first estimates what these emigrants would have earned in India, and then integrates the resulting counterfactual distributions with details of the Indian fiscal system to estimate fiscal impacts. Two distinct methods to estimate the counterfactual earnings distributions are implemented: a translation of actual U.S. incomes in purchasing power parity terms and an income simulation based on a jointly estimated model of Indian earnings and participation in the workforce. The PPP methods indicate that the foregone income tax revenues associated with the Indian-born residents of the U.S. comprise one-third of current Indian individual income tax receipts. Depending on the method for estimating expenditures saved by the absence of these emigrants, the net fiscal loss associated with the U.S. Indian-born resident population ranges from 0.24% to 0.58% of Indian GDP in 2001.

What do surveys tell us on how to win Latin America’s soul?

As the Economist magazine features in “The battle for Latin America's soul”, Latin American countries one by one is falling into hands of populists who oppose to economic reforms. It thus becomes an urgent question how market economy and economic reform can win Latin America’s soul again?

Ugo Panizza and Monica Yanez from the Inter-American Development Bank recently published a paper titled “Why are Latin Americans so unhappy about reforms?” in which they looked into the  Latinobarometro survey, which was conducted yearly in Latin American countries since 1996, for answers.

They use the opinion surveys to document discontent with the pro-market reforms. They explore  four possible sets of explanations for this discontent: (i) a general drift of the populace’s political views to the left; (ii) an increase in political activism by those who oppose reforms; (iii) a decline in the people’s trust of political actors; and (iv) the economic crisis.

What they find  is that the macroeconomic situation plays an important role in explaining the dissatisfaction with the reform process, while the other factors are not important. 

Detailed research of the survey data show that even if in 1997 100% of people belong to the center right, while in 2002 100% of them convert to extremist left, the support for reform will only go down by 9%. This means that even such an extreme assumption of drift to the left can only explain one third of the actual drop in support for reforms.

The survey results also show that increasing political activism of the leftists or decline in the trust of political actors cannot explain the drop in support for reforms

The single most important factor is the economy. Drop of GDP growth by one percentage point can reduce support for reforms by 1.1%. In the case of Argentina, growth rate dropped by 21 percentage points  between 1997 and 2002, which would predict a drop in support for privatization equivalent  to 23 percentage point.

In Latin America, countries experiencing crisis usually fall into vicious cycle.  When the economy performs badly or experiences a crisis, it becomes much easier for populists to get into power and halt economic reforms. Without reforms the country cannot gain real competiveness internationally, and the political situation becomes self-reinforcing as the economy deteriorate further (sometimes several years can be saved with high oil price, but then the pain will be felt harder when oil price drops).

Economic and employment growth is the only criteria voters use to evaluate reforms, and they usually don’t give you second chance. Reformists need to think more about the stability consequence of the reforms they propose, because “one strike, you are out”. Better do it slowly but safely.

Reference:

Why are Latin Americans unhappy about reforms?

How to subvert democracy: a user’s guide provided by former Peruvian secrete police chief Montesinos

Which of the democratic checks and balances—opposition parties, the judiciary, a free press—is the most forceful? Professors John McMillan and Pablo Zoido find the answer from an unusual place: the secret dossier of Vladimiro Montesinos.

In the 1990s, the Peruvian secret-police chief Montesinos systematically undermined all of these democratic checks and balances with  bribes. For record-keeping and to ensure future cooperation of the bribe-takers, he video-taped and kept detailed records of almost all of his dealings with more than 1,600 bribe-takers.

After the fall of President Fujimori and the arrest of Montesinos himself, these video-tapes and documents come under public scrutiny 

Professors McMillan and Zoido obtained some copies from journalist friends in Perue, and creatively quantify the values of these democratic checks and balances using the bribe prices.

They find that, Montesinos paid a television-channel owner about 100 times what he paid a judge or a politician. One single television channel’s bribe was five times larger than
the total of the opposition politicians’ bribes.  The cost of bribing the politicians to get a majority in Congress added up to less than US$300,000 per month. The total cost of bribing judges was US$250,000 per month. The total cost of bribing the television channels was more than US $ 3 million per month.

By revealed preference, the strongest check on the government’s power was the news media.

Montesinos is smart but everyone makes mistakes at some point. He bribed all television channels but one: Channel N. He thought Channel N was an expensive channel with limited viewership and was not worth bribing.

Just several months after Fujimori won 2000 election, one of Montesinos’s videotapes (which will come to be called the vladivideos) was broadcast on Channel N.

The government fell. Fujimori fled to Japan. Montesinos was arrested in Venezuela and sent back to Peru for trials.

Reference:
How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru (PDF file)

A video showing Montesinos counting out US$1.5 million for Jose Francisco Crousillat, the VP of America Television, Channel 4

Bribe receipts. Left: a supreme court justice acknowledges being paid US$10,000. Right: a member of the National Electoral Board acknowledges being paid US$15,000

Genetic determinant of national economic prosperity: empirical evidence

Is economic prosperity of a nation partly determined by genes of its population?

Is this a question that is too politically incorrect? Well, scientific inquiry has no boundary. Economics professors Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg study genetic and economic data for a wide cross section of countries around the world, and discover that genetic distance, a measure associated with the amount of time elapsed since two populations' last common ancestors, bears a statistically and economically significant correlation with pairwise income differences.

They also find that genetic distance between two populations also determines differences in human capital and social institutions, which suggests that differences in human characteristics transmitted across generations - including culturally transmitted characteristics - can affect income differences by creating barriers to the diffusion of innovations.

The Diffusion of Development  (PDF file)
Abstract: This paper studies the barriers to the diffusion of development across countries over the very long-run. We find that genetic distance, a measure associated with the amount of time elapsed since two populations' last common ancestors, bears a statistically and economically significant correlation with pairwise income differences, even when controlling for various measures of geographical isolation, and other cultural, climatic and historical difference measures. These results hold not only for contemporary income differences, but also for income differences measured since 1500 and for income differences within Europe. We uncover similar patterns of coefficients for the proximate determinants of income differences, particularly for differences in human capital and institutions. The paper discusses the economic mechanisms that are consistent with these facts. We present a framework in which differences in human characteristics transmitted across generations - including culturally transmitted characteristics - can affect income differences by creating barriers to the diffusion of innovations, even when they have no direct effect on productivity. The empirical evidence over time and space is consistent with this "barriers" interpretation.