Russian “corruption market” estimated 3 billion USD/year

Russian thinktank INDEM Fund based on its annual survey estimates that the volume of Russia's “everyday corruption market” (i.e., sum of the bribes to be paid by citizens within one year) is 3 billion USD in year 2005, a slight increase from 2.8 billion USD in year 2004. The methodology of the study takes into two factors that determines the “market of corruption”: (1) corruption risk (authorizer’s corruption pressure onto citizens) (2) corruption demand (citizens’ readiness to bribe)

Several “services” occupy the top positions of “market share”:

(1) Higher education: to enter, transfer, exams, etc (583 million USD);
(2) Free medical service (401 million USD);
(3) Solving problems related to conscription procedure (354 million USD)
(4) Dwelling: to obtain and/or legalize a relevant proprietary interest ( 299 million USD)
(5) To obtain justice in law-court (210 million USD)
(6) to solve problems with road police authorities (obtaining driver’s license, technical examination, road traffic, etc.) (183 million USD) . Obtaining driver's license is quite a "business" in many developing countries; you may also want to read a World Bank report on corruption of obtaining driver’s license in India (hat tip: PSD blog)

The Russian corruption report by INDEM Fund can be found here.

Five billion is certainly surprisingly a small amount, compared to China’s 50-84 billion USD/year, which amouts to 3-5% of China's GDP (according to an global anti-corruption report by OECD, co-authored by among others Janos Bertok). The China and Russia numbers however are not quite comparable, because the Russian number only takes into account everyday bribes, while petty bribe is  actually a relatively smaller problem in China compared to embezzlement of public funds.

In China, according to the same OECD reports, two-third of the corruption fugitives were senior executives of state-owned enterprise. When they fleed(to favorite destination: California, New Jersey, Canada, where extradition treaties are not signed with China), they bring with them huge amount of money.

Liberalization of imports harms India?

Ashok Sharma in the Indian newspaper Financial Express argues that unilateral and unconditional lowering of tariff for sugar imports harm India

“... the institution of TRQ for sugar import is unilateral and unconditional. We have not in exchange negotiated for raising our low bound tariff rate of 45% on soyabean oil. The policy of unilateral and unconditional liberalisation of imports will weaken India’s negotiating position at WTO. It will endanger domestic production as had been the case with vegetable oil and oilseeds.”

If this were true, then why don’t India raise tariff to 1000% or close the economy completely from international trade then? This should be able to gain India formidable negotiating position at WTO, according to the theory of Mr. Sharma.

Sometimes, busting a myth requires just a little bit of counterfactual thought experiment.

How to subvert democracy: a user’s guide provided by former Peruvian secrete police chief Montesinos

Which of the democratic checks and balances—opposition parties, the judiciary, a free press—is the most forceful? Professors John McMillan and Pablo Zoido find the answer from an unusual place: the secret dossier of Vladimiro Montesinos.

In the 1990s, the Peruvian secret-police chief Montesinos systematically undermined all of these democratic checks and balances with  bribes. For record-keeping and to ensure future cooperation of the bribe-takers, he video-taped and kept detailed records of almost all of his dealings with more than 1,600 bribe-takers.

After the fall of President Fujimori and the arrest of Montesinos himself, these video-tapes and documents come under public scrutiny 

Professors McMillan and Zoido obtained some copies from journalist friends in Perue, and creatively quantify the values of these democratic checks and balances using the bribe prices.

They find that, Montesinos paid a television-channel owner about 100 times what he paid a judge or a politician. One single television channel’s bribe was five times larger than
the total of the opposition politicians’ bribes.  The cost of bribing the politicians to get a majority in Congress added up to less than US$300,000 per month. The total cost of bribing judges was US$250,000 per month. The total cost of bribing the television channels was more than US $ 3 million per month.

By revealed preference, the strongest check on the government’s power was the news media.

Montesinos is smart but everyone makes mistakes at some point. He bribed all television channels but one: Channel N. He thought Channel N was an expensive channel with limited viewership and was not worth bribing.

Just several months after Fujimori won 2000 election, one of Montesinos’s videotapes (which will come to be called the vladivideos) was broadcast on Channel N.

The government fell. Fujimori fled to Japan. Montesinos was arrested in Venezuela and sent back to Peru for trials.

Reference:
How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru (PDF file)

A video showing Montesinos counting out US$1.5 million for Jose Francisco Crousillat, the VP of America Television, Channel 4
Bribe_video

Bribe receipts. Left: a supreme court justice acknowledges being paid US$10,000. Right: a member of the National Electoral Board acknowledges being paid US$15,000
Bribe_receipt

Hepatitis B: the reason why China has higher male-to-female ratio

In many Asian countries the ratio of male to female population is higher than in the West -- as high as 1.07 in China and India, and even higher in Pakistan. Most people blame the parental preference for boys in these countries and one-child policy in China for creating the gender imbalance. Chicago University professor Emily Oster has new explanation, that the sex ratio imbalance is caused by hepatitis B virus that are prevalent in these countries.

Existing medical literature indicates that carriers of the hepatitis B virus have offspring sex ratios as high as 1.55 boys for each girl. Hepatitis B is common in many Asian countries, especially China, where some 10 to 15% of the population is infected.

Professor Oster  finds that hepatitis B can explain about 45% of the “missing women”: around 75% in China, between 20% and 50% in Bangladesh, Egypt, and West Asia, and under 20% in India, Pakistan and Nepal.

For governments that are worrying about potential social unrest and threats created by tens of millions of bachelors, the solution is to vaccinate their people agaisnt Hepatitis B virus, which will naturally bring more girls into the "marriage market".

Hepatitis B and the Case of the Missing Women  (PDF file)
Published in the Journal of Political Economy
Abstract:  In many Asian countries the ratio of male to female population is higher than in the West -- as high as 1.07 in China and India, and even higher in Pakistan. A number of authors (most notably Sen, 1992) have suggested that this imbalance reflects excess female mortality and, as a result, have argued that as many as 100 million women are ``missing. This paper proposes an explanation for much of the observed over-representation of males: the hepatitis B virus. Evidence drawn from the existing medical literature as well as new studies of recent vaccination efforts indicate that carriers of the hepatitis B virus have offspring sex ratios as high as 1.55 boys for each girl. This is strongly supported by cross-country evidence on hepatitis B prevalence and sex ratios at birth. Hepatitis B is common in many Asian countries, especially China, where some 10 to 15% of the population is infected. Using data on viral prevalence by country as well as estimates of the effect of hepatitis on sex ratio drawn from a wide range of sources, I find that hepatitis B can explain about 45% of the missing women: around 75% in China, between 20% and 50% in Bangladesh, Egypt, and West Asia, and under 20% in India, Pakistan and Nepal.

Red states, blue states, and the welfare state: geography rules!

The divide of “Red states, blue states” exists not only in the UnitedStates, but almost everywhere in the democratic free world. It is also true in every country that liberal parties always concentrate their support in urban areas, even in countries where urban areas are in much richer than rural areas. Another stylized fact we always observe is that in countries that adopt plurality electoral rule as opposed to proportionate representation electoral rule, socialist candidates are less likely to take power.

Why is it so? Professor Jonathan Rodden (MIT) provides an explanation based on economic geography. By economic of scale and agglomeration economy, it is natural that manufacturing bases always cluster together and form what will be later called urban metropolitan areas. Workers, who reside in these urban areas are more likely to be mobilized around a redistribution agenda. This is why liberal parties have to rely on urban voters.

Business interests in some countries, when they extended franchise to workers more than 100 years ago, however build a safeguard in the electoral system to prevent socialists and communists from taking power. This safeguard is the so-called “plurality electoral rule” and “small single-member electoral district”.

Because workers are concentrated in urban areas, pro-redistribution candidates usually have a lot of surplus vote in urban area. Single-member districts however make it difficult for workers (who are usually concentrated in small number of urban districts) to translate votes into seats, because a victory with 30% margin or 5% margin is not different when it comes to allocation of seats.

Another geography law that goes against leftist parties is that, in single-member district system, for a party to win, the pivotal voter is the median voter in the median district (which happens to be suburban area), who are usually politically to the right of the national median voter. If the leftist party wants to win over this voter by moving their platform to the right, another more fundamentalist leftist party will enter from the far left to steal away lefties votes; If it doesn’t move to the right, however, it will never win a majority. This creates a dilemma and a mission impossible for leftist parties.

In many continental European countries, proportionate representation (PR) electoral rule combined with multi-member large electoral districts, however, help workers to pull together their votes. This is why in these countries, socialist pro-redistribution candidates are more likely to be elected. Professor Rodden predict that, in two otherwise identical countries, the one that uses single-member district plurality electoral rule will less likely to develop a redistribution welfare state.

As a matter of fact, in the UnitedStates, we can also observe the effects of the two different electoral systems. Electoral districts for the House of Senate are state-wide and combine rural, urban and suburban areas. Workers in urban states thus can effectively translate their numbers into seats, and pro-redistribution Senate candidates are more likely to be elected. This is why in U.S. Senate, although rural states by design are overrepresented, the political orientation is still biased to the left compared to the House of Congress where congressmen are elected from small single-member districts.

Reference:

Jonathan Rodden: Read states, blue states, and the welfare states (PDF file)

Edward Glaeser: Myths and Realities of American Political Geography (PDF file)

The political economy of hatred: What cause racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Americanism

Harvard professor Edward Glaeser's  new study “the political economy of hatred” demonstrate to us how politicians – “the entrepreneurs of hate” –   spread hate-creating stories to discredit opponents whose policies benefit an out-group.

If you repeat a lie often enough, it becomes the truth. People who hear these stories think they might be true and will investigate those stories only if there are private benefits from learning the truth.

Anti-Semitism also occurs in places where there are no Jews and among people who have never met Jews. 34 percent of French but only 27 percent of the Vietnamese have an unfavorable opinion of the United Sates, although the latter had a bitter war with the U.S. only several decades ago.  According to the 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World, 89% of Kuwaitis and 96% of Pakistanis do not believe that Arabs destroyed the World Trade Center.

The central prediction of Professor Glaeser’s model is that hatred will be spread against poor minorities by anti-redistribution candidates and spread against rich minorities by pro-redistribution candidates. It is always cheaper and more convenient to refute your opponents by spreading hatred. Hilter, in an attempt to discredit socialist, preferred to cite the high percentage of intellectuals of Jewish origin among social publicists as proof of its subversion.  Galeser attributes the tragedy of Jewish to the natural law that hatred is particularly likely to spread against groups that are politically relevant and socially isolated.

In his study, he uses a theoretically model and three examples to illusrate the idea. The tree examples are (1) racism in the United States (2) Anti-Semitism in 19th century Europe (3) Islamic hatred of Americans.  Very nice analysis.

The Political Economy of Hatred (PDF file)
Abstract: This paper develops a model of the interaction between the supply of hate-creating stories from politicians and the willingness of voters to listen to hatred. Hatred is fostered with stories of an out-group's crimes, but the impact of these stories comes from repetition not truth. Hate-creating stories are supplied by politicians when such actions help to discredit opponents whose policies benefit an out-group. Egalitarians foment hatred against rich minorities; opponents of redistribution build hatred against poor minorities. Hatred relies on people accepting, rather than investigating, hate-creating stories. Hatred declines when there is private incentive to learn the truth. Increased economic interactions with a minority group may provide that incentive. This framework is used to illuminate the evolution of anti-Black hatred in the United States South, episodes of anti-Semitism in Europe, and the recent surge of anti-Americanism in the Arab world.

Why are levels of welfare benefits lower in some states? Research shows that racism may be one of the reasons

Why are levels of welfare benefits higher in some American states and lower in others? Some may speculate that maybe residents in the former states are altruists and more moral than others.

Academic research however shows that the differences are the results of both financial self-interest and interpersonal preferences (well, we usually call it racism).

A study done by Harvard professor Erzo Luttmer and published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics shows that:
(1) Individuals decrease their support for welfare if there are more welfare recipients in their area
(2) Individuals increase their support for welfare spending if a larger fraction of welfare recipients in their area belongs to their racial group (Question: which  word with r as the initial do we usually use to describe such type of preference, thought, and behavior?)

He derives the results from nation-wide surveys as well as voting behaviors in California’s Proposition 165 in 1992 primaries, in which governor Pete Wilson proposed both cuts in welfare generosity and changes in the state budget process.

Professor Luttmer concludes that the results also help to explain why welfare benefit levels are relatively low in racially heterogeneous states. Actually, the results also help to explain why European countries redistribute more than we do, as they are usually racially more homogenous.

Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution (PDF file)
Abstract: Interpersonal preferences - preferences that depend on the characteristics of others - are typically hard to infer from observable individual behavior. As an alternative approach, this paper uses survey data to investigate interpersonal preferences. The General Social Survey contains self-reported preferences for welfare spending, which I validate with voting behavior on cuts in welfare benefits. Using this preference measure, I show that preferences for income redistribution are not only determined by financial self-interest but also by interpersonal preferences. These interpersonal preferences are characterized by a negative exposure effect - individuals decrease their support for welfare if there are more welfare recipients in their area - and racial group loyalty - individuals increase their support for welfare spending if a larger fraction of welfare recipients in their area belongs to their racial group. My results hold when areas are defined as states, metropolitan areas or census tracts and are robust to various specification checks. Direct evidence that individuals' preferences for redistribution are partly determined by the effects of redistribution on the utility or lifestyle of others in their community is valuable for the development of more accurate theoretical models and for the design of redistributive policies. The results also help to explain why welfare benefit levels are relatively low in racially heterogeneous states.

Don't say “they steal our manufacturing jobs” before your children!

In last commentary "culture is your destiny", I mentioned that our own children will be influenced by our own culture, and it is our responsibility to teach them the good virtues and good work ethics for them to be able to compete with others when the grow up.

There is empirical evidence that even if we don’t teach them, they will learn from us. Professors Raquel Fernandez and Alessandra Fogli study the work and fertility behavior of women 30-40 years old, born in the U.S., but whose parents were born elsewhere, and find that past female labor force participation and total fertility rates from the country of ancestry have strong explanatory power on the work and fertility outcome of these second-generation immigrants.

So, please behave yourself before your children! If you always talk before them about “they steal our manufacturing jobs”, they will start thinking that “other people steal my high school graduate certificate” or lying about "The dog eats my college degree" when they don’t study hard and fail the tests.

Culture: an empirical investigation of beliefs, work, and fertility (PDF file)
Abstract: We study the effect of culture on important economic outcomes by using the 1970 census to examine the work and fertility behavior of women born in the U.S. but whose parents were born elsewhere. We use past female labor force participation and total fertility rates from the country of ancestry as our cultural proxies. These variables should capture, in addition to past economic and institutional conditions, the beliefs commonly held about the role of women in society (i.e., culture). Given the different time and place, only the beliefs embodied in the cultural proxies should be potentially relevant. We show that these cultural proxies have positive and significant explanatory power for individual work and fertility outcomes, even after controlling for possible indirect effects of culture. We examine alternative hypotheses for these positive correlations and show that neither unobserved human capital nor networks are likely to be responsible.

Does the new labor law really harm French youth? Who actually take to Paris streets? The truth is...

Cpe French are  taking to streets protesting. Why? They say they are protesting against a newly passed law that gives employers the right to fire workers under the age of 26 during their first two years on the job. They are outraged as it sounds that it gives the right to employers to fire people at their will. For them, it is like “What? You passed a law giving capitalists the right to kill people.....”

What does the law really do?

If I am an employer, and I am (under the old law) not given the right to fire a worker once I hire him; What will I do when making hiring decisions?  First, I am very reluctant to hire any one, as I fear that I may be burdened by him in case the demand for my products turns out lower than expected. Second, I will prefer hire an elder and more experienced worker, as I can know his quality from his previous career. As a result, under previous French labor law that making firing very difficult, unemployment is high and in particular for young people without any working experiences.

The new law is addressing exactly this problem. They give the right to employers to fire young workers under the age of 26 during their first two years on the job. Now I am more comfortable in hiring new and young workers. First, I can hire him when sales are rising and fire him when demands are low. (Note that previous I won’t hire this person in the first place); Second, I am willing to try out a young worker, because compared to an elder worker, it is easier for me to fire him if he turns out to be of low quality.  Thus the law will give many people the change of a first job. This is why the law is known as First Job Contract (The Contrat Premiere Embauche, or CPE)

Many workers are outraged by the word “fire”. But think about it: you can only be fired if you are hired in the first place. If you are unemployed, a law that protects you from being fired is meaningless.  Let me ask you: would it be a great thing if we pass a law permitting people to get anything from grocery stores for free? Isn’t it great? But in that case grocery shops will be empty and shopkeepers will move away and you would starve and cry outside the shops, and the law is meaningless for you. I don’t think I need to elaborate on another example such as passing a law exempting everyone from paying back credit card debts. Does it mean that then you will get unlimited credits from banks?

Why do they take to streets and who are they?!

Now you understand that the law actually helps unemployed young people? But why do they take to streets? French are smart people and they should have already figured out what I say. Yes, they do! And that’s exactly why they don’t take to streets. Ironically, It is another group of people that are protesting, those who are over 26, educated , or unionized. Hey, the “victims” are staying home, why are you instead in such a  hurry?!

As rightly pointed out by a BusinessWeek article,

“The students involved in the most recent demonstrations against the CPE are the ones least likely to be affected by it. That's because university students in France are often nearly 26 by the time they complete their studies. Relatively few would thus fall under the law's purview. Similarly, many of the trade unionists and civil servants protesting the CPE are also unlikely to ever be affected by it because they already have extremely strong job protection. Indeed, the French youth who might benefit the most from the CPE, the immigrant and first-generation youth that burned the suburbs of Paris last year, are rarely seen or heard from in the fevered demonstrations about CPE. "To a certain extent," notes Six, "It's the wrong kids marching in the street."

Now their motive is clear:  it is not about protecting the relatively unskilled young people, it is about protecting their own turf. Under the new law, unskilled young people will be given more chances by employers in trying their first jobs, threatening the job positions of elite college students and trade unionists. When the old law made firing workers very difficult, employers usually prefer experienced workers (who are already unionized) or college graduaes who demonstate their quality by being admitted into colleges and having managed through graduation. Under the new law, everyone is equal, and employers can check out who are of higher quality. Elite college students and unionists do not like this. It's that simple.

It is perfectly understandable that people protest against legislative changes that negatively affect their own interest. But by cheating? By claiming that you are protesting on behalf of those who you actually want to get rid of? Give me a break.

Globalization and taste convergence: The cases of wine and beer

We’ve heard too much discontents of globalization. Globalization however is unstoppably changing every aspects of our life. Take alcohol consumption as an example.  Joshua Aizenman and Eileen L. Brooks at the University of California (“wine country” campus?) examine historic data in 38 countries around the world and discover that there is clear convergence in the consumption of wine relative to beer between 1963 and 2000 . Relative consumption of wine can be explained well in 1963 by grape production and latitude, but these variables are much less significant in 2000. Now you don’t need to live in wine country to be able to enjoy great wines!

Tip for our readers: In another paper "Products and Prejudice: Measuring Country-of-Origin Bias in U.S. Wine Imports" , Professor Brooks discovers a secret that a “Product of Italy” label can raise the price of a bottle of wine by more than 50% without raising the quality, which means that:  if you see two bottles of wine with same price, one is “Product of Italy” and the other from Argentina, don’t buy the Italian one! Curious why folks beleive that Italian wine should sell at higher prices? because they are better economists?

Globalization and taste convergence: The cases of wine and beer
Abstract: This paper investigates changes in cultural consumption patterns for a low concentration industry: wine and beer. Using data on 38 countries from 1963-2000, there is clear convergence in the consumption of wine relative to beer between 1963 and 2000. Convergence occurs even more quickly within groups of countries that have a higher degree of integration. A key prediction of international trade is confirmed in the data: greater trade integration weakens the association between production and consumption patterns – although the relative consumption of wine can be explained well in 1963 by grape production and latitude, these variables are much less significant in 2000. Despite these “scientific” explanations for the consumption of wine, there is also a cultural angle to wine consumption. While the relative wine consumption of France and Germany is converging, several Latin American countries fail to converge. The patterns of convergence are consistent with dynamics of adjustment in an overlapping generation habit formation model.

Iraq: war vs. containment

Three Chicago economists (Davis, Murphy, and Topel) have produced a highly controversial paper, as mentioned by R-Squared in a previoius commentary "Chicago economists produce a paper on how war in Iraq helps save Iraqi lives". 

hey evaluate –from the standpoint of 2003—the expected costs of going to war in Iraq versus the costs of continuing the containment policy.  All in all, “going to war was the best decision”.

Policy decisions of such magnitude are usually made under considerable uncertainty, a tight timing, and substantial stress.  Economics can improve the decision making process: by seriously and consistently evaluating all alternatives under the table.  Maybe the best contribution of their paper is that it clearly establishes that the alternative of going to war was not doing nothing.  In fact, the alternative was continued containment or other options.  These had costs, and serious decision-making should consider them as well.

How do the authors arrive to these findings?  As for the benefits and costs of war, they evaluate:

· X number of Iraqi deaths now, versus Y later
· Upfront costs of war, versus prolonged costs of containment
· A big shock to Iraqis today versus a long period of continued economic misfortune
· The humanitarian costs of continued repression under Sadam

Do they do a good job of evaluating the alternatives?  Judge for yourself.

Chicago economists produce a paper on how war in Iraq helps save Iraqi lives

Steven J. Davis, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert H. Topel, three famous economics professors in the University of Chicago, publish a working paper on how war in Iraq may help save Iraqi lives. It is part of their ongoing academic project studying how to deal with “tyrants, rogue states and terrorists who threaten not only their own people but also others.”

Their analysis indicates that war and forcible regime change will yield large improvements in the economic well-being of most Iraqis relative to their prospects under the containment policy, and that the Iraqi death toll would likely be greater under containment.

“This conclusion follows from some basic observations.
First, the Iraqi economy was in terrible condition before the war, and it would have remained in a sorry state under the policy of containment.
Second, the regime of Saddam Hussein was an economic failure of tremendous proportions. The available evidence suggests that real income per capita fell by roughly 75 percent as a consequence of Saddam’s misrule. In addition, much of Iraq’s greatly diminished output was diverted to an oversized military, an apparatus of terror and repression and the relentless glorification of Saddam.
Third, the removal of sanctions, the expansion of petroleum exports, large-scale reconstruction aid, and the reintegration of Iraq’s economy into the world economy provide a strong basis for economic gains – even in a society with serious institutional weaknesses. If, over the course of a generation, Iraqis recover even half of the economic losses they suffered under Saddam Hussein, then they will be significantly better off in material terms as a consequence of forcible regime change.”

They emphasize that:

“Had containment remained in effect, the historical record suggests that premature Iraqi deaths would have continued indefinitely at the rate of 10,000 to 30,000 per year.”

The working paper can be located at:
War in Iraq versus Containment (longer version)
War in Iraq versus Containment (Shorter version)

Note: Professor Joseph Stiglitz disagrees with them and argues that the costs of war in Iraq could well exceed two trillion US Dollars, if U.S. troops are maintained in Iraq through 2015. See: "The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years after the Beginning of the Conflict"

What will Scandinavians do for a cheap drink? I told you no regulations are unbeatable!

Last time in the Bulletin I mentioned Chinese's genius solution to one-child policy:  using drugs to increase chance of bearing twin babies. Recently I heard another interesting story that I would like to share with you. It happened in 1999, an old story, but it is amazing that our trustworthy law-abiding Nordic folks are as innovative and imaginative when it comes to dodging taxes.

Before June 1999, Scandinavians were allowed to carry duty-free alcohols and cigarettes when “crossing” borders. Taxes and duties are extremely high for these products, and thus it created huge incentive for Scandinavians to ride on the cheap ferry cruises  between Stockholm and Helsinki and purchase duty-free products on board. As a matter of fact, most passengers return on the same ships: the only reason for their long-haul two-way trip is to purchase duty-free stuff.

However, after June 1999, after they joined European Union, travel between Sweden and Finland is no longer regarded as border-crossing, and the duty-free benefits are gone. Ferry traffic plummeted. What were they going to do? Please guess.

Scandinavians came up with a genius solution. There is an Aland Island between Sweden and Finland, which were given tax-exempt status when Finland joined the European Union. The ferry cruise companies detour every one of their ships to Aland Island in their previously non-stop Stockholm-Helsinki route!

Why do the world’s richest always have better-looking children? The example of Mittal family

A widely-received explanation is that: the statistical odd of a rich man marrying an equally rich woman is slim; and for a woman from a poorer background to marry into a rich family, she is at least over-average in terms of looks. Thus their children will inevitably become better looking than their farther, thanks to their mother’s genes. Let me illustrate this with the example of Mittal family. The family head Lakshmi Mittal is the world’s third richest man, and the richest Indian.
Here is his picture:
Lakshmi_1   
And here are pictures of his son Aditya Mittal and daughter Vanisha Mittal. Apparently, they must have a very beautiful mother.
Adityamittal Vanishasmall

Below are pictures of Aditya Mittal with his wife and Vanisha Mittal with her husband. I am very sure Lakshimi’s future grandchildren will be even more good looking.
Wedding1512005121319 Anello

And don’t forget that Lakshmi Mittal’s initial wealth was inherited from his farther Mohan Lal Mittal, also a rich man; We can comfortably guess that Mohan Mittal could be much less good-looking than his son Lakshmi (although I am not able to find Mohan's photo through google).

Bottomline: It takes generation to improve the gene of a family!

No regulations are unbeatable, not even China’s one-child policy

Economists have long told us that people respond to incentives! Given proper incentives, you will be amazed by the kind of genius solutions people can come up with. No regulations are unbeatable, because the people and businesses you are regulating are always more-motivated than employees in regulatory agencies, and they will always be able to find some ways to avoid the regulations. Sometimes, it takes the form of bribery, in the others genius and absolutely legal solutions.

China: Drug bid to beat child ban
SHANGHAI, China (AP) -- More Chinese women are exploiting easy access to fertility treatments to skirt China's one-child limit, leading to a boom in numbers of multiple births, an official newspaper reported Monday. The main pediatric hospital in the eastern city of Nanjing recorded 90 births of twins or triplets last year, up from an average of 20 in past years, the China Daily said.

Genius solution notwithstanding, Isn’t it better for people to spend their time and talent in more productive activities (well, certainly having more children is also a “productive” activities) than in avoiding regulations.

Wherever there is a regulation, there is always some way to circumvent it, and this is how tax codes in the United States accumulate to thousands of pages of long, and Americans wastes tens of billon of dollars just to avoid them. By some estimation, it is actually better off for the society if American tax officers are corrupted because you may spend less money bribing them than hiring tax advisors, and in both cases American government won't recieve your money anyway.

The usefulness of corruptible elections in China

In China, frequent elections are hold at village level. They are believed to be rigged, and at least heavily influenced by the government. Two economics professors Loren Brandt and Matthew Turner at the University of Toronto however find that these elections, although corruptible, are still very effective in reducing rent-seeking activities.

In the fall of 2000, they conducted surveys in 60 villages in 30 counties in 6 provinces in China. Based on the detailed data they collect from villagers, they conclude that  even in most corruptible environment with the most rigged elections,  there is strong negative relationship between rent-seeking activities an re-election success, which suggests that villagers are able to punish those who don’t act in the interests of their constituents.

Most importantly, they find that restrictions on proxy voting improve the ability of rural Chinese electorates to oversee their leaders. This is consistent with reports that proxy voting is widely abused to rig elections. They also find that public nominating procedure also leads to better corporate governance, but mainly through the channel of recruiting the most capable leaders instead of providing incentive for incumbents to work harder in order to stave off more competent challengers.

Surprisingly, they find it does not help much to provide a public forum for candidates to debate and make speeches, or to fix the locations of ballot boxes. The explanations (I beleive) could be that (1) within a village everyone knows each other and public election campaign becomes less relevant; (2) it is easier and safer  to rig the elections through proxy voting procedure than to physically manipulate the ballot boxes.

The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections
ABSTRACT: Using a sample of rural Chinese villages which have recently been the subject of democratic reforms we look for relationships between marginal changes in the democratic process and marginal changes in economic outcomes. We find that even very poorly conducted elections can have large incentive effects. That is, even corruptible elections provide leaders with strong incentives to act in the interests of their constituents. Our findings also allow us to rank the importance of four possible election reforms which have attracted the attention of international observers and academic researchers.

Why do Chinese become rich?

According to BusinessWeek:

"Now China is embracing millionaires. More than 300,000 Chinese have a net worth over $1 million, excluding property, according to Merrill Lynch & Co. And mainland millionaires control some $530 billion in assets, Boston Consulting Group estimates."

Why do they become rich so quick once unbounded from the bygone central planning regime?

Read this article in the Economist about one of China's richest men, and you will find out the answer. Culture is your destiny!

China's uneasy billionaire
....He confesses that he cannot play golf, and cut short a holiday in Canada recently because he was bored. He works 13-hour days because “I wouldn't know what else to do,” and to relax just watches television.
Such self-denial and workaholism partly reflect the fact that he built his wealth slowly—like Li Ka-shing, who is known for his cheap shoes and plastic watches. As a boy, Mr Wong recycled bottles after school to supplement the income of his farming family.

The Internal Job Market of the IMF's Economist Program

IMF looks quite open-minded in innovating its human resource system, and it doesn't lack first-class in-house microeconomists to design and implment a state-of-the-art optimization program.

The Internal Job Market of the IMF's Economist Program
Greg Barron and Felix Várdy
Abstract: This paper shows how the internal job market for participants in the IMF's Economist Program (EPs) could be redesigned to eliminate most of the shortcomings of the current system. The new design is based on Gale and Shapley's (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm and generates an efficient and stable outcome. An Excel-based computer program, EP-Match, implements the algorithm and applies it to the internal job market for EPs. The program can be downloaded from http://www.people.hbs.edu/gbarron/EP-Match_for_Excel.htm.

Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein's view on happiness

Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein published a Global Equity Strategy paper proposing the following microeconomic policies that may make the world a better place. Recently, Six women in the U.S. filed a case against DKW for 1.4 billion USD. I speculate that those creative lawyers may use this Strategy Paper against DKW, arguing that the Paper is implicitly targeting at male employees only, asssuming that only men "equate happiness with money"

• Don’t equate happiness with money. People adapt to income shifts relatively quickly, the long lasting benefits are essentially zero.
• Exercise regularly. Taking regular exercise generates further energy, and stimulates the mind and the body.
• Have sex (preferably with someone you love). Sex is consistently rated as amongst the highest generators of happiness. So what are you waiting for?
• Devote time and effort to close relationships. Close relationships require work and effort, but pay vast rewards in terms of happiness.
• Pause for reflection, meditate on the good things in life. Simple reflection on the good aspects of life helps prevent hedonic adaptation. • Seek work that engages your skills, look to enjoy your job. It makes sense to do something you enjoy. This in turn is likely to allow you to flourish at your job, creating a pleasant feedback loop.
• Give your body the sleep it needs.
• Don’t pursue happiness for its own sake, enjoy the moment. Faulty perceptions of what makes you happy, may lead to the wrong pursuits. Additionally, activities may become a means to an end, rather than something to be enjoyed, defeating the purpose in the first place.
• Take control of your life, set yourself achievable goals.
• Remember to follow all the rules.

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